Defense Expert: Iran’s Cluster Missiles Must Be Stopped at High Altitude

A leading Israeli missile defense specialist explains that Iran's cluster warheads become impossible to stop once they release their multiple bomblets. Dr. Uzi Rubin says successful interception must happen well above the 7-kilometer altitude where these weapons typically disperse their submunitions.

A prominent Israeli missile defense authority warns that Iran’s cluster-equipped missiles present a critical timing challenge for defensive systems.

“After the cluster has opened, it’s too late,” Dr. Uzi Rubin explained to The Media Line, emphasizing the narrow window available to neutralize these weapons.

Rubin’s assessment comes amid growing scrutiny of cluster warhead technology used in Iranian missile strikes during recent hostilities with Israel. These weapons release numerous smaller explosive devices rather than delivering one large blast, creating unique defensive challenges.

The fundamental problem, according to Rubin, is straightforward: ballistic missiles equipped with cluster warheads must be destroyed before their payload separates and scatters submunitions. After that dispersal occurs, the weapon transforms from a single target into multiple threats, drastically reducing the effectiveness of interception efforts.

Rubin brings extensive credentials to his analysis. He established and directed Israel’s Missile Defense Organization from 1991 through 1999, guiding development of the Arrow system—Israel’s initial national missile defense capability. His subsequent roles included senior positions at Israel’s National Security Council, Israel Aerospace Industries, and the Defense Ministry. He also conducted research at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Arms Control. The Israeli government recognized his contributions with Defense Prizes in 1996 and 2003, while the US Missile Defense Agency honored him with the David Israel Prize.

When describing cluster warhead mechanics, Rubin began with historical context. “What is a cluster warhead?” Rubin said. “A cluster warhead is a class of bombs, which were more famously used in the Vietnam War and other wars. It’s a bomb which contains, instead of one big barrel of explosive, it contains a lot of small bomblets.”

He outlined the weapon’s operation during its final approach. “So a cluster warhead for a missile is the same thing,” Rubin said. “The tip of the missile, instead of containing a big barrel of explosives, contains a mechanism which holds on to a lot of small bombs. And when the missile approaches the target, it opens its skin, it peels off, and it spins around, and the bomblets are released and released into space and fall on the ground.”

Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal encompasses various systems developed over many years, with most capable of carrying different warhead configurations, Rubin noted. “Every one of their missiles, and they have several types, heavier ones, smaller ones,” he said. “For each one of them, they have a regular warhead or a cluster warhead.” The quantity of submunitions depends on the specific missile platform and its carrying capacity. “Cluster warheads can contain, let’s say, from 20-30 bomblets to 70-80 bomblets; it depends on the type of the missile.”

Defense systems face a critical timing constraint when engaging these threats. Interceptor missiles must eliminate incoming weapons while their warheads remain consolidated. After cluster mechanisms activate and disperse bomblets, successful interception becomes significantly more challenging since the destructive payload has already separated.

“Interception usually is done if it’s successful,” Rubin said. “It’s not always successful. It’s above the altitude where it opens there, and it disperses the cluster, when it’s still held in one piece.”

Technical analysis indicates cluster warheads typically release their contents at relatively low altitudes compared to ballistic missile flight paths. “In the papers, they say that the opening altitude of clusters is a dispersed altitude of 7 kilometers,” Rubin said. “Seven kilometers is pretty low. Most of the interception is done above that.”

Despite their unique characteristics, cluster warheads don’t require fundamentally different defensive approaches, according to Rubin. The core strategy mirrors that used against conventional ballistic missiles: eliminate the threat as early as possible during its flight path, well before it approaches target areas. “So, there is no difference in intercepting cluster warheads than the regular warhead,” he said. “You have to intercept them well away from the target.”

Below certain altitudes, successful interception becomes extremely difficult regardless of warhead type. “After the cluster has opened, it’s too late,” Rubin said. “But anyway, even if there’s not a cluster, a unitary bombhead, a barrel, below a certain altitude, you cannot intercept it anymore. It’s too late.”

This altitude limitation clarifies a widespread misunderstanding about Israel’s layered defense network. Iron Dome targets short-range rockets, while Arrow systems engage long-range ballistic missiles at high altitudes above Israeli airspace. The internationally recognized Iron Dome system isn’t designed to handle ballistic missile threats. “The Iron Dome is too low for that,” Rubin said. “The Iron Dome is not designed against that. It’s designed against a short-range rocket.”

Cluster and conventional warheads serve distinct tactical purposes, Rubin explained. Cluster munitions distribute damage over broader areas, posing greater threats to exposed personnel and unfortified facilities. “It depends for what use,” Rubin said. “A cluster warhead is very dangerous against troops in the open, against installations which are not protected.”

Traditional warheads focus their destructive force at single impact points. “A unitary warhead is more dangerous to, like you saw what happened last night in that village … that was a unitary warhead,” Rubin said.

Individual bomblets carry relatively modest explosive power compared to full ballistic missile payloads, but their combined impact remains lethal. Rubin likened submunition effects to rockets frequently launched by militant groups from Gaza. “No, it’s a small bomb,” he said. “The effect is like a Grad, a rocket that comes from Gaza. It can be fatal.”

The cluster warheads employed in recent conflicts aren’t new technology, Rubin emphasized. When asked whether versions used in current fighting differed from those fired in previous Iranian-Israeli exchanges, his response was brief. “Same thing,” he said. “They fired less of them, but it’s the same thing.”

For Rubin, the central challenge isn’t technological innovation but the compressed timeframe for effective response. Missile interception depends on altitude and split-second timing. Early destruction prevents warhead deployment; failure shifts the focus from prevention to damage mitigation.