The Media Line: Egypt and Turkey Move in Step as Washington and Jerusalem Pull Apart 

Egypt and Turkey Move in Step as Washington and Jerusalem Pull Apart 

Regional coordination between Cairo and Ankara accelerates amid growing differences between the US and Israel over Turkey’s role after the Gaza war 

By Waseem Abu Mahadi/The Media Line 

[CAIRO] In the aftermath of the Gaza war, US and Israeli officials are increasingly diverging in how they assess Turkey’s regional role—a shift that has become more visible as Egypt and Turkey deepen military and security coordination after years of estrangement. 

The timing is specific. In recent days, US envoy Steve Witkoff has been preparing to meet in Miami with senior officials from Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar to discuss next steps on Gaza, placing Ankara inside a diplomatic format focused on ceasefire implementation and postwar arrangements. The inclusion reflects Washington’s view that Turkey remains a necessary regional actor, even as Israel continues to view Ankara with deep suspicion. 

That difference in approach now sits at the center of a growing US–Israel gap. While Washington has sought to widen the circle of regional partners involved in managing the postwar phase, Jerusalem has pressed to keep Turkey outside any framework that could shape Gaza’s future security order. 

This is not a public rupture, but a widening divergence over sequencing and control. US officials describe their approach as pragmatic, aimed at sustaining calm and preventing renewed escalation. Israeli officials see the same process as eroding informal limits that once constrained Ankara’s influence. 

“After the Gaza war, US and Israeli views diverge much more sharply on Turkey than on Egypt,” said Prof. Chuck Freilich, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and a former deputy national security adviser. “For Washington, Turkey remains an ally. Israel, however, sees Turkey as a hostile state and is trying to keep it out of Gaza and out of security affairs more broadly.” 

Events on the ground have sharpened that divergence. In late September, Egypt and Turkey conducted joint naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean, their most visible military cooperation in more than a decade. The drills marked a clear break from years of frozen military ties following the political rupture of 2013. 

The exercise concluded on September 30 after several days of activity in Turkish territorial waters and was attended by senior commanders from both navies, underscoring the level of institutional commitment behind the renewed engagement. Officials from both sides described the drills as part of an effort to standardize operational coordination and expand practical cooperation at sea. 

In Washington, the exercises were largely treated as a bilateral normalization step between two regional partners. In Jerusalem, they were read differently: as evidence that Egyptian–Turkish normalization has moved beyond diplomacy into operational coordination at a moment when Gaza’s postwar architecture remains unsettled. 

Those concerns are now being translated into concrete coordination. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is scheduled to meet in Jerusalem on Tuesday with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides, according to Netanyahu’s office. The meetings will include separate bilateral talks followed by a trilateral summit and joint statements to the press. Greek media reported last week that the three countries are examining the creation of a joint rapid-response military force in the Eastern Mediterranean, reflecting growing concern in Athens—and increasingly in Jerusalem—over Turkey’s expanding military posture in the region. 

The military thaw has been accompanied by diplomatic mechanisms designed to make coordination routine rather than episodic. In November, Egyptian and Turkish foreign ministers met in Ankara to launch a joint planning framework intended to manage cooperation across political, security, and regional files. Follow-up discussions later in the month focused on implementation, signaling an effort to institutionalize coordination rather than rely on ad hoc contacts. 

Taken together, these steps help explain why attention has sharpened now. What was once viewed as a cautious thaw increasingly resembles an emerging architecture capable of supporting deeper coordination with less political friction, including on sensitive regional issues. 

Gaza has become the central test case. As ceasefire talks move beyond immediate humanitarian pauses and into discussions over longer-term arrangements, negotiators are grappling with unresolved questions of governance, border management, reconstruction oversight, and international security involvement. 

Washington’s approach has been to keep multiple regional actors engaged to sustain momentum. Israel’s position has been more restrictive, particularly when it comes to any international stabilization force that could include Turkey. 

“That has led to disagreement with the administration, especially over Israel’s insistence that Turkey should not be included in any stabilization force in Gaza,” Freilich told The Media Line, noting that this position is unlikely to be fully accepted in Washington. 

US officials have not publicly opposed the expanding Egyptian–Turkish coordination, reflecting a broader effort to manage relations among partners without blocking pragmatic cooperation. The friction lies not in overt policy clashes, but in differing assumptions about control and sequencing. 

From Israel’s perspective, the concern is less about any single move and more about whether the current US administration is fully equipped to manage these regional shifts, Freilich said. “There is a sense that Washington has not yet fully geared up professionally in the areas where it needs to.” 

In Jerusalem, this is seen as a structural issue rather than a tactical one. As US attention remains divided across multiple global crises, regional actors are testing new alignments and frameworks that could outlast the current war. 

From Cairo’s perspective, officials and analysts frame the rapprochement with Turkey as pragmatic rather than confrontational. Egypt’s outreach reflects overlapping interests across several regional files and a desire to manage complex challenges through coordination. 

“The Egyptian–Turkish rapprochement is not limited to Gaza,” said Tarek Fahmy, a Cairo-based political analyst and professor of international relations. “It spans several regional files, including the Eastern Mediterranean, despite Cairo’s deep reservations about Turkey’s role.” 

Fahmy argued that the significance of the rapprochement extends beyond immediate tactical coordination. 

“The Egyptian–Turkish rapprochement offers a model for balancing major regional interests through coordination,” Fahmy told The Media Line. “If it proves successful in Gaza, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean, it could eventually extend to Syria.” 

He added that Egypt is also looking beyond its immediate neighborhood, including Syria and strategic flashpoints in the Horn of Africa and the Nile Basin—regions where Turkey already has a significant presence. 

From Ankara’s vantage point, analysts say Turkey has moved over the past decade from Muslim Brotherhood–aligned ideological ambition to a more transactional, state-to-state realism. The break with Egypt marked the turning point: Ankara backed the Brotherhood after the 2011 Tahrir Square uprising and sharply opposed the 2013 military takeover that brought Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to power. As el-Sisi consolidated control and regional tolerance for Brotherhood politics evaporated, Turkey recalibrated. 

“Those were the old days,” said Ömer Özkızılcık, an Ankara-based analyst. “Turkey’s foreign policy then was value-driven. Today it’s realist.” 

Now, limited Turkish participation in postwar arrangements carries different implications for Washington and Jerusalem. US officials see it as a tool for leverage and stabilization. Israeli officials see it as a constraint that could narrow future options to curb Hamas. 

Özkızılcık suggested that Ankara does not necessarily envision a leading role. “Egypt could lead, with Turkey as a secondary actor, but everything must be under a UN mandate,” he said. 

From Cairo, officials continue to stress that coordination with Turkey does not signal a strategic shift away from existing commitments. Mohammed Ibrahim, a former Egyptian diplomat and senior analyst at the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies, emphasized Egypt’s focus on continuity. 

“Egypt must first and foremost be understood as a sovereign regional power that operates according to its own national interests,” Ibrahim told The Media Line. 

For Washington and Jerusalem alike, the deeper question raised by Egypt–Turkey coordination is not whether normalization itself is destabilizing, but whether the postwar Middle East is entering a phase in which US management is lighter and regional actors are freer to shape outcomes. 

“That feeds broader concern about the US role in the Middle East right now,” Freilich said. “This anxiety is not limited to Israel alone; many countries across the region share similar doubts about Washington’s current capacity to shape events effectively.” 

From Cairo’s perspective, strict adherence to treaties remains the guiding principle. 

“Any adjustments, especially those related to security arrangements in the Sinai Peninsula, are carried out strictly within the mechanisms provided by the peace treaty and require the agreement of both sides,” Ibrahim said.