The Media Line: Largest US Military Buildup Since 2003 Raises Prospect of Multi-Week Strike on Iran 

Largest US Military Buildup Since 2003 Raises Prospect of Multi-Week Strike on Iran 

Analysts say the scale of American force deployment in the Middle East signals preparation for a sustained US campaign against Iran, one that could extend beyond nuclear targets and directly challenge the regime’s leadership 

By Gabriel Colodro / The Media Line 

“As I understand it, this is the biggest military buildup in the Middle East since 2003,” Col. Richard Kemp, a former British Army commander, told The Media Line. He paused on the comparison. The amount of force now in place, he said, is greater than what was visible during the 12-day war in June 2025. “It’s very significant military power,” he added. 

For weeks, the word “imminent” has circulated in Washington and across the region. But timelines remain unclear. It could unfold quickly. It could take longer. Kemp’s focus was less on rhetoric and more on the military posture taking shape around Iran. 

“I think it’s likely there will be a military strike, but I don’t think you’d say it’s inevitable,” he said. “I think it’s very likely.” 

The 2003 comparison is not just a line for emphasis. The footprint on the ground and at sea has grown noticeably in recent weeks. 

There are now four American carrier strike groups either in the wider Middle East or moving toward it. That alone changes the equation. In the surrounding waters, roughly a dozen guided-missile destroyers are spread out, some near the Strait of Hormuz, others operating closer to the Red Sea. 

The United States already had a large presence in the region. More than 40,000 personnel are stationed across military bases and naval assets. With the arrival of the most recent carrier group, several thousand more service members are being added to that total. 

The air posture has shifted as well. Long-range B-52 bombers and B-2 stealth aircraft have been placed on higher readiness. Additional fighter jets, including F-16s, F-22s, and F-35s, have been moved forward. At Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, alert levels have been raised. The adjustments are not only about striking capacity. They also reflect concern over what might follow.  

Taken together, the concentration is difficult to dismiss as routine. 

The 12-day war in June 2025, which began on June 13, had a defined military purpose. Kemp described that round as focused primarily on Iran’s ballistic missiles and on its nuclear program. Israel led the bulk of that campaign, striking air defenses and missile-related targets. The United States joined toward the end. The fighting was intense but limited in scope. It was not framed as an effort to dismantle the regime itself. 

Kemp commented that President Donald Trump would likely prefer to force Tehran into concessions without resorting to open war. “I think he would prefer Iran to buckle under the military pressure that’s been building up around them and make significant concessions, particularly on the nuclear program, but also on ballistic missiles and potentially on sponsoring terrorist proxies in the region as well,” he said. “He would like to be able to stand up and say, ‘I have resolved this through negotiations rather than through military force.’” 

But Kemp expressed doubt that Iran would offer concessions that are both meaningful and durable. “Nothing that Iran agrees to or says can be trusted,” he said. “They’ll just use it as a tactic to buy time for themselves.” 

If diplomacy fails, the forces now deployed suggest preparation for something more than a limited strike designed to send a message. Kemp explained that the buildup must be understood in two layers. One layer concerns offensive capability. The other pertains to the protection of American personnel and regional allies. 

“One is what you need to actually damage Iran, bring down the regime, destroy the key components in Iran that are used offensively against other countries in the Middle East, of course, Israel particularly,” he said. “The second element is defensive.” 

American forces stationed across the Gulf, including in Qatar, would be exposed to Iranian missiles and allied militias in the event of military action. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would have to consider their own vulnerability. Israel would almost certainly be a primary target of retaliation. Kemp noted that defending “such a wide range of targets” requires substantial resources, not only aircraft and ships but also layered missile defenses and regional coordination.  

Kemp also suggested the possibility of preemptive or parallel action against Iranian proxies. Hezbollah in Lebanon has been significantly weakened since last year, he said, but it still retains the ability to launch missiles into Israel. The Houthis in Yemen remain capable of long-range attacks. “They would have to be dealt with either before a US strike in Iran, or at the same time,” he said. “We’re talking about a much more intensive attack.”  

The question of duration is central. Would a new confrontation resemble the compressed timeline of June 2025, or would it evolve into something longer? 

“I would say much longer than a couple of days,” Kemp said. “It could run into weeks. It could well be a fairly long, sustained bombing campaign against Iran.” 

He stressed that planners would assess results continuously. Objectives would be defined in advance, but the campaign’s length would depend on whether those objectives were being met. “They won’t probably know now how long it’s going to last,” he said. “It depends on the effect.” 

Brig. Gen. Amir Avivi, founder of the Israel Defense and Security Forum, framed the moment in even starker terms. He told The Media Line strategic debate has already moved beyond nuclear facilities. 

“The objective of the 12-day war was to destroy their nuclear capability and stop the rapid buildup with ballistic missiles,” Avivi said. “Now we are talking about taking down the regime. It is something completely different.” 

In his view, Tehran misread the aftermath of June 2025. Rather than de-escalating, Avivi said, Iran continued to channel resources into missile development and into sustaining its regional network of proxies, despite domestic hardship. “There is no way to stop this threat and the instability in the Middle East without dismantling this regime,” he said. 

Avivi suggested that under certain conditions, including accurate intelligence and rapid targeting of command structures, the regime could be brought down within weeks. “I think in two weeks it could be done,” he said, while acknowledging that much depends on internal dynamics inside Iran. 

He argued that the real variable is not only missiles or aircraft, but the public itself. Iran is under economic strain, he said, and dissatisfaction has not disappeared. Should outside military action align with renewed unrest, the regime would be confronting pressure internally as well as externally. 

Kemp, while more cautious, also indicated that leadership targets would likely be central if the objective extends to regime collapse. “If the objective is to topple the regime, then one of the primary targets has to be the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps],” he said. 

He did not rule out unconventional elements. “I wouldn’t be surprised if we see troops on the ground,” Kemp said. “I don’t mean large scale. I’m talking about special forces commandos, maybe, to directly take out the Ayatollah and some of the other leadership. I don’t think we should exclude the possibility of that happening, as well as the air campaign.” 

Avivi rejected the idea that a regime-focused campaign would necessarily require large foreign ground forces. If there are “boots on the ground,” he said, they would not belong to American or Israeli troops. 

“The boots on the ground are the Iranian people,” he said. 

In his view, sustained military pressure from the outside could intersect with growing frustration inside the country. Economic hardship, infrastructure shortages, and political repression have eroded confidence in the leadership, he argued. If the regime’s military backbone weakens, domestic unrest could do the rest. 

“You need to eliminate the leadership,” he said. “You need to break their military capability completely.” 

Asked about proxy escalation, Avivi said the likelihood is “very high” if Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other aligned groups interpret the confrontation as existential. He added that he had spoken recently with senior Israeli military leadership and described a sense of readiness and alertness. “There is no 100%,” he said, acknowledging that ballistic missiles would likely strike Israel and present serious challenges. 

The difference from June 13, 2025, is therefore not only the scale of American hardware now visible in the region. It is also the objective being articulated by some of those assessing the situation. 

“The primary target,” Kemp said, “is going to be the leadership and the effort to try and bring the regime down.” 

Whether the objective can be achieved primarily from the air, requires limited ground operations, or results in order or prolonged instability remains uncertain. What appears less uncertain, in their assessment, is that the current posture is not designed for symbolism. 

“It’s needed in order to sufficiently damage the regime,” Kemp said. “Not a token strike.”