The Media Line: Saudi-UAE Split Fractures Anti-Houthi Coalition as Iran-US Tensions Threaten Red Sea 

Saudi-UAE Split Fractures Anti-Houthi Coalition as Iran-US Tensions Threaten Red Sea 

The coalition architecture that once united Gulf powers against Iranian proxies is now divided, leaving the Houthis facing less coordinated pressure than at any point since their Red Sea campaign began 

 By Waseem Abu Mahdi/The Media Line 

The Iran-backed Houthis signaled Monday they may resume attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, releasing threatening videos as the USS Abraham Lincoln entered the region and President Donald Trump warned that American “fleets” were heading toward Iran. 

The timing is critical: The threats come as a widening rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates fractures what was once a unified coalition against the Houthis, handing Tehran’s most effective proxy a strategic advantage precisely when Iranian proxies across the region are mobilizing in anticipation of a potential US-Iran confrontation. 

The split has triggered a violent power shift in southern Yemen. In recent weeks, Saudi Arabia has moved to displace UAE-backed forces, deploying its own National Shield Forces and Giants Brigades to assert control over Aden, Hadramaut, and Al-Mahrah—a realignment that has sparked protests, exposed deep divisions, and raised questions about Riyadh’s ability to impose lasting security. 

The contested transition came into sharper focus Friday as protests erupted in Aden and Mukalla, where supporters of the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—the UAE-backed separatist movement now being sidelined—raised the flag of the former South Yemen state and carried portraits of STC leader Aidarus al-Zoubaidi. 

“We are taking part in these demonstrations to reaffirm our support for Aidarus al-Zoubaidi and to reject any attempt to dissolve the Southern Transitional Council or strip us of our right to self-determination and independence for the South,” Ali Awas, an Aden resident who joined the rally, told The Media Line. 

Turnout was down sharply from earlier rallies this month—a shift attributed to Saudi Arabia paying salaries to former STC-affiliated forces and delivering improvements in electricity and public services in what analysts describe as a strategy of co-optation alongside displacement. 

The tensions have turned deadly. On Jan. 21, a car bomb targeted the convoy of Brig. Gen. Hamdi Shukri, commander of the Saudi-backed Second Giants Brigade, killing five of his escorts. While no group claimed responsibility, the attack highlighted the violent resistance to Saudi Arabia’s consolidation of control. 

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan acknowledged the split Monday in unusually direct terms. 

“The Kingdom is keen on establishing strong and positive relations with the UAE, given its stature as an important partner in the Gulf Cooperation Council,” he said in Warsaw after meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski. “On Yemen, there are differences in visions. The UAE has now decided to leave Yemen, and I think if that indeed is the case and the UAE has completely left the issue of Yemen, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will take responsibility.” 

Behind that diplomatic language lies a forced transition. Saudi Arabia is betting on development aid and direct military control to assert authority through the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and Saudi-backed forces. The UAE model had relied on local proxies like the STC, which for years maintained de facto control over key southern infrastructure and security forces. 

While the UAE formally reduced its troop presence in Yemen in 2019, it continued to exert decisive influence through allied forces. That arrangement increasingly clashed with Saudi Arabia’s determination to consolidate authority under Riyadh-controlled structures, leading to the recent military displacement. 

The competing approaches reflect economic rivalry as much as military strategy. Both powers are racing to diversify away from oil dependence, with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 now directly challenging the UAE’s decade-long head start as the region’s financial hub. Economic competition for foreign investment and regional headquarters has steadily eroded the strategic coordination that once defined their alliance. 

Yemen is one of several theaters where the divergence has materialized. In Sudan, Saudi Arabia has accused the UAE of backing the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group—allegations Abu Dhabi denies. Similar competition has emerged in Somalia and Somaliland, where the two powers support rival political actors, and in Libya, where their aligned forces compete for influence. 

The protests followed confusion earlier this month after figures close to al-Zoubaidi announced that the STC had dissolved itself, a claim quickly denied by other senior officials. Although the announcement was brief, it exposed mounting pressure on southern leaders as Saudi Arabia pushes for full subordination to the PLC. 

For years, the STC operated with significant autonomy despite being formally incorporated into Yemen’s government under Saudi-brokered power-sharing agreements. But Saudi Arabia’s recent military moves have begun dismantling that parallel structure—a shift that has triggered resistance from forces and communities that view the STC as their political representative. 

Maher Abu al-Majd, an Istanbul-based Yemeni journalist specializing in political affairs and international relations, told The Media Line that the crisis in the south cannot be understood outside the framework of regional competition. 

“The Southern Transitional Council emerged as part of this competition,” he said. “Although it was formally included in the legitimacy framework under the Riyadh Agreement, it functioned in practice as a counterweight to that legitimacy.” 

The rivalry was shaped by the UAE’s strategic gains in the early years of the war. 

“The UAE has made many gains in Yemen,” al-Majd said. “It has expanded its military and security control along the Yemeni coast, occupying positions around Bab al-Mandab, controlling neighboring islands, and extending its influence along the Arabian Sea coast from Shabwa to Hadramaut, as well as parts of the Red Sea coast.” 

Those advances eventually alarmed Riyadh. 

“Saudi Arabia felt those Emirati moves boxed it in strategically, particularly in relation to Jeddah, the Red Sea, and Saudi Arabia’s maritime security,” al-Majd said. 

The UAE insists its military withdrawal from Yemen is complete. But the transition on the ground has been contentious. In recent days, Yemen’s Hadramaut governor, Salem Al-Khanbashi, accused the UAE of maintaining a “secret prison” and weapons cache at Riyan Airport in Mukalla—claims the UAE Defense Ministry dismissed as “deliberate fabrications.” 

On Jan. 15, the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council replaced Prime Minister Salem bin Braik with Foreign Minister Shaea Muhssin Al-Zindani— a reshuffle reflecting mounting economic strain and growing frustration in Riyadh over the government’s inability to consolidate authority. 

Saudi Arabia has announced a $500 million development package for southern Yemen following what officials described as a reduction in Emirati involvement, signaling the kingdom’s intent to expand its footprint in areas long shaped by Abu Dhabi. 

The convergence of these crises—Gulf disunity fracturing the anti-Houthi coalition, Iran-US tensions escalating toward potential conflict, and the Houthis threatening to resume Red Sea attacks—has created a strategic opening for Tehran at one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. The coalition architecture that once united Gulf powers against Iranian proxies is now divided, leaving the Houthis facing less coordinated pressure than at any point since their Red Sea campaign began. 

The rift between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi extends well beyond Yemen. The two powers are competing for influence over Red Sea shipping routes, port facilities from Djibouti to Sudan, and economic corridors linking the Gulf to Africa and the Mediterranean—a contest forcing countries across the region to choose sides in a fundamental realignment of Gulf power. 

The strategic rivalry has left Yemen’s anti-Houthi camp deeply fractured. 

“The Houthis benefit directly from divisions inside the legitimacy framework,” al-Majd said. “Yemen effectively ended up with three separate armed structures rather than a single national army.” 

The fragmentation has allowed the Houthis to consolidate territorial control and strengthen institutional governance, even as their rivals struggle to maintain cohesion—or fight among themselves. 

David Des Roches, a defense and strategic expert, told The Media Line that Washington views the dispute primarily as internal Gulf business rather than a crisis requiring immediate intervention. 

“The growing split between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen is mainly a political problem,” he said. “Washington views it as internal Arabian Peninsula business and does not want to become deeply involved. Yemen is not a core US national security interest in the way Iran’s nuclear program is.” 

In contrast to their Red Sea adventurism, on the mainland, the Houthis have largely avoided major offensives, instead consolidating their stronghold in northern Yemen. Despite occasional clashes, the group faces little sustained pressure as its opponents realign and, in some cases, turn on each other. 

The Houthi threats that emerged Monday emphasized how the split has emboldened the group. The Houthis released footage showing a previous attack on the British-linked oil tanker Marlin Luanda in January 2024, claiming 228 Red Sea vessels had been targeted in support of Gaza and concluding with the message: “What is coming will be greater.” A separate video showed a vessel engulfed in flames, captioned with one word: “Soon.” 

The footage is both a warning to the Trump administration, which has threatened military action against Iran following the killing of anti-government protesters, and a signal to Tehran, demonstrating Houthi capabilities as Iran mobilizes its regional proxy network. The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency reported Sunday that at least 5,848 people have been killed during the unrest as a nationwide internet blackout entered its 18th day. 

The USS Abraham Lincoln—carrying squadrons of F/A-18 and F-35 fighter jets—entered Middle Eastern waters, according to a US official cited by Al-Monitor. Trump said last week that American “fleets” were heading toward Iran “as a precaution.” 

The Houthis began launching drone and missile attacks against maritime shipping in the Red Sea in October 2023, following Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. The attacks halted in October last year after a US-backed cease-fire agreement in Gaza took effect. 

Iran has repeatedly warned against any US military action, with Defense Ministry spokesperson Brig. Gen. Reza Talaei-Nik saying Monday that any American or Israeli attack would be met with “a response more painful and decisive than in the past.” 

On Sunday, Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah called on fighters worldwide to prepare for a “comprehensive war” in support of Iran. 

The regional realignment was highlighted Monday when the United Arab Emirates said it would not allow its airspace, territory, or waters to be used for any hostile military action against Iran, putting Abu Dhabi on a different side of the US-Iran standoff than its traditional Saudi allies. 

As Iran and the United States edge closer to confrontation, the Houthis have emerged as a critical pressure point, capable of threatening global shipping lanes while shielded by the very coalition fragmentation that was supposed to contain them. Yemen’s fractured landscape creates security vacuums that extremist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula have historically exploited during moments of institutional collapse and factional conflict. 

“Any division between Saudi Arabia and the UAE directly benefits the Houthis,” Des Roches said. “While their opponents are fragmented, the Houthis remain unified and disciplined, allowing them to maintain control, carry out attacks and impose what amounts to a strategic choke point in the Red Sea—a threat not only to Yemen, but to regional and global security.”