The Media Line: Security Gaps in Syrian Camps and Prisons Raise Risk of ISIS Reemergence 

Security Gaps in Syrian Camps and Prisons Raise Risk of ISIS Reemergence 

A senior Syrian security source familiar with intelligence reports that have not been publicly released said: “There are indications that some ISIS detainees managed to escape from certain prisons during the past months” 

By Rizik Alabi/The Media Line 

[DAMASCUS] Seven years after the geographical fall of the so-called “caliphate,” the issue of Islamic State (ISIS) detainees in northeastern Syria continues to pose complex security, legal, and humanitarian challenges at every level.  

Recent prison reorganizations and detainee air transfers point to an unusual level of coordination between the United States, Iraq, and Syria, reflecting growing concern over the risk of mass escapes and the possibility that thousands of fighters could reemerge in active conflict zones. 

Sources obtained by The Media Line estimate that the number of ISIS detainees in northeastern Syria ranges between 9,000 and 12,000, distributed among prisons in Al-Hasakah, Raqqa, and al-Shaddadah.  Among these are prominent leaders whom American sources classified as “the worst of the worst” because of their involvement in wide-scale terrorist operations since 2014. 

In Al-Hasakah’s Ghwayran prison alone, there are approximately 3,000–5,000 detainees, while al-Shaddadah prison holds about 1,500 detainees, with 2,000 at al-Aqtan prison.  In addition, al-Hol camp houses around 43,000 people, mostly women and children linked to members of the organization. European data indicate that approximately 700–800 detainees hold European nationalities, including 450 French, 90 Dutch, 77 German, 55 Belgian, and 27 British nationals, which further complicates the issue at the legal and political levels. 

A senior Syrian security source familiar with intelligence reports that have not been publicly released said that “there are indications that some ISIS detainees managed to escape from certain prisons during the past months,” adding, while requesting anonymity in remarks to The Media Line, that these incidents were not recorded on a wide scale but confirm security weaknesses at some facilities. 

Mahana Jamal, an expert on jihadist groups, told The Media Line that “the opportunities available for the escape of the organization’s members reflect weak local security coordination, and any limited escape could constitute a nucleus for the reformation of sleeper cells, whether in Syria or across the border into Iraq.” 

In the face of the possibility of a mass escape of about 6,000 high-risk detainees, the United States launched a series of air transfer operations described as unprecedented, involving around 50 flights over the course of weeks, including the transfer of approximately 6,000 detainees, among them 500–600 foreigners.  

These operations relied on military transport aircraft and helicopters to ensure speed and security, with daily coordination between US Central Command, the Department of Defense, and intelligence agencies, under the supervision of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. American sources described these operations as having prevented a “catastrophe that would have changed the region and perhaps the world overnight,” referring to the fact that the collapse of the prisons would have led to the immediate reconstitution of the organization. 

At the same time, control over several prisons and the al-Hol camp in Raqqa and Al-Hasakah was gradually transferred to institutions affiliated with the Syrian government. Al-Aqtan prison came under the control of the Syrian army, while al-Shaddadah prison was managed by the Syrian Ministry of Interior through the army, and al-Hol camp came under the supervision of Damascus, with plans to transfer a number of residents to other areas. This shift reflects the end of the Syrian Democratic Forces’ monopoly over managing detainees and raises questions about the ability of the Syrian authorities to maintain stability in a fragile environment after years of war and chaos. 

Iraq, which experienced the Islamic State’s control over vast areas of the country in 2014, views these developments as a direct threat to its national security. All transferred detainees, regardless of their nationality, will be subject to Iraqi judicial proceedings in accordance with applicable legal procedures, with comprehensive documentation of crimes. Baghdad is also coordinating with European countries to repatriate their nationals, with a focus on preventing any mass escape and the reconstitution of the organization within Iraqi territory. 

European concerns are rising amid the continued presence of hundreds of their citizens among the detainees, as the possibility of “illegal return” through smuggling networks and the rebuilding of sleeper cells constitutes a direct threat to European national security. The challenge is twofold: managing internal security risks and addressing the legal and political questions surrounding the prosecution and rehabilitation of foreign fighters. 

Al-Hol camp remains the greatest long-term challenge, as it houses around 43,000 people, including thousands of children and women, many of whom are foreign nationals. The camp poses serious security and social concerns due to the presence of extremist influence networks capable of perpetuating ISIS ideology, especially among children who grew up amid violence and radicalization. 

With reintegration and rehabilitation programs still limited and around 18,000 Iraqi nationals awaiting phased transfers to their home areas, the camp remains without a comprehensive legal and humanitarian strategy. 

The ongoing changes reflect overlapping regional and international interests. The United States is focused on preventing an ISIS resurgence without committing to a long-term military presence. Iraq is working to secure its borders and avoid a repeat of the 2014 collapse, while Syria views control over the camps and prisons as a means of reinforcing sovereignty and internal security. 

European states, meanwhile, face complex legal and political challenges related to the repatriation and prosecution of their nationals. Russia, Turkey, and Iran are also closely monitoring the issue as part of broader regional power dynamics in eastern Syria. 

The recent measures have had short-term success in averting the worst-case scenario. High-risk leaders were transferred, and an immediate security collapse was avoided. However, containment alone does not amount to a durable solution. 

Significant gaps remain, particularly among detainees and within the broader camp population, including women and children exposed to extremist influence. Without a more complete approach, these vulnerabilities could create conditions for the organization’s reemergence. 

A sustainable response would require a comprehensive strategy that integrates security, legal, humanitarian, and educational components. Without such coordination, the current arrangements risk breaking down under renewed pressure. 

In conclusion, the challenge now facing the international community is more complex than that posed by the earlier military campaign. The focus has shifted to detention, legal proceedings, and social rehabilitation, where the ability to bring this chapter to a definitive close and to prevent the reemergence of ISIS–related security threats is being tested both regionally and internationally, particularly in Europe and neighboring countries.