The Media Line: The Gaza Ceasefire Is Under Strain; How Washington Will Try To Prevent It From Unraveling

The Gaza Ceasefire Is Under Strain; How Washington Will Try To Prevent It From Unraveling

Likud MK Eli Dallal: ‘The president of the United States has said that if Hamas doesn’t disarm, he will go in himself. That’s the crucial point.’

By Giorgia Valente/The Media Line Staff

In recent days, a ceasefire framework between Israel and Hamas has come under visible strain. Accusations of violations and sporadic violence have tested the agreement’s early phases, while American envoys press the parties and regional intermediaries to hold the line. The US push is unusually assertive: Washington has publicly tied its credibility to sustaining the truce and is working the regional phones to sequence next steps—hostage issues, demilitarization benchmarks, and a workable interim governance mechanism for Gaza.

That external pressure intersects with a granular, often technical debate over how the ceasefire becomes durable: what constitutes verified demilitarization, how to prevent spoilers, and who provides basic services and security “the morning after.” The interviews below—two members of Israel’s Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and a US geopolitical consultant—sketch both the political logic and the operational friction points that will determine whether the truce stabilizes.

For Steven Terner, geopolitical consultant at Terner Consulting LLC, the asymmetry in American pressure reflects leverage and self-interest rather than preference for one party: “The Trump administration very badly wants the war to come to an end for a variety of reasons and is pressuring Israel more than Hamas because the US has much more influence over Israel than it does over Hamas,” he said to The Media Line.

He notes that Washington’s public posture raises the cost of failure: “For one thing, the Trump administration has already publicly claimed success in ending the war between Israel and Hamas, so if the war were to continue, it would be quite embarrassing and undermine the administration’s credibility both at home and abroad,” he added.

Terner also links the ceasefire to a broader regional agenda: “It also wants to expand the Abraham Accords as well as other Middle Eastern trade and security agreements,” he said.

But he cautions that the very states helping to keep channels open can slow wider integration: “The conflict between Israel and Hamas also involves many regional players who are involved to different degrees on either side of the conflict. Their competing interests on this conflict are obstacles to expanding mutually beneficial agreements regarding other issues,” he added.

And he argues the strategic calculus for Washington favors closure: “The ongoing conflict has not seemed to accomplish any strategic goals in a very long time. However, it still drains resources from the United States and causes a lot of trouble politically for supporters of either side within the American political spectrum,” he explained.

Across Israel’s political spectrum, there is broad agreement on the end goals—no return to Hamas rule and a demilitarized Gaza—but also sharp differences on how to get there and who should take the lead.

Yesh Atid MK Ram Ben-Barak of Yesh, a former deputy director of the Mossad, diagnoses the present dynamic as the result of delays and the consequent expansion of American stewardship: “Look, there’s no doubt that Israel’s hesitation—its government’s delay in trying to push for a political agreement to end the war over the past two years, and to establish an alternative government to Hamas in Gaza, has led to a situation where we’ve essentially had an agreement imposed upon us,” he said to The Media Line.

“If, a year and a half or even a year ago, we had done this—reached this agreement with Egypt and the moderate Arab states—Qatar and Turkey would never have been brought in. That’s a very bad outcome. When I look at what’s happening now—Trump basically forcing Bibi to do what he says—I still support the agreement. I think there could have been a better one, without Turkey and Qatar, and long ago, saving soldiers’ and hostages’ lives. But today, we are literally a protectorate of the United States,” he added.

“In my view, given this reckless government, that’s actually a good thing, because the alternative, letting them run things on their own, would be far worse,” he further said.

On implementation, he outlines a security-first, Arab-led transition that seeks to marginalize Hamas by replacing its “address” for daily life: “I believe the solution is political—an outcome where there’s no Hamas in Gaza. It will take time and determination. First, we need to establish a credible governing address for Gaza’s residents—someone they can turn to with their problems. Today, they go to Hamas, because it’s the authority. They need a new authority to go to, and only then, with resolve, can we move forward,” he said.

“The Arab countries must put their soldiers on the ground—together with the Americans, with intelligence coordination—and Israel should remain in the extended perimeter until a new government is stabilized there. Then, together, we’ll crush Hamas, again and again, until it disappears,” he added.

“But Israel shouldn’t be the one waging the war—it should assist the Arab forces and the new governing body they set up, whether that’s an Arab technocratic committee or some joint administration. They’ll be the governing address, and we’ll help them fight Hamas. It won’t take a week, a month, or even five years. But in the end, Gaza will be rebuilt, governed by a nonterrorist entity, and secured by Arab forces ensuring Hamas doesn’t return. That’s the way forward—there’s no other path,” he concluded.

From within the governing coalition, Likud MK Eli Dallal, a member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, supports the framework but ties success to concrete, sequential outcomes: “First of all, this is a good agreement—but its success will be measured by its implementation. The Americans want it to succeed, and one of the main goals—actually, the three main goals they spoke of—are, first, the return of all the hostages. Yes, some will be returned, but we are still waiting for the bodies of those who were killed,” he said.

“The second issue is the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip and the dismantling of Hamas’s infrastructure. Everyone involved has committed to that, and that’s where the real test will be. Everything else is just background noise for now,” he added.

When asked about the key issue, he points to a specific condition and a US guarantee if that condition isn’t met. “Of course—it’s necessary to remove the weapons and demilitarize Gaza. But what’s truly significant here is that, for the first time, the president of the United States has said that if Hamas doesn’t disarm, he will go in himself. That’s the crucial point,” he concluded.

Gabriel Colodro contributed to this article.