The Media Line: ‘Which Model for the Middle East?’ Trump and MBS Bet on a Saudi-Centered Order 

‘Which Model for the Middle East?’ Trump and MBS Bet on a Saudi-Centered Order 

As Washington recalibrates and regional powers realign, Riyadh pushes a vision that could redefine Middle Eastern geopolitics 

By Giorgia Valente / The Media Line 

The pageantry on the South Lawn this week—military bands, rows of American and Saudi flags, and the first White House visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) under the new Trump administration—masked a conversation far more consequential than another set of arms negotiations. 

Behind closed doors, President Donald Trump and the crown prince took a decisive step toward reshaping the regional balance of power, putting Riyadh at the center of a new Middle Eastern security architecture and testing political red lines that have defined US policy for decades. Their discussions spanned far-reaching defense arrangements, access to fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets, civilian nuclear cooperation, artificial intelligence partnerships, and the political conditions under which Saudi Arabia might one day normalize ties with Israel. 

For Riyadh, the summit offered a chance to formalize its emerging doctrine of stability—one that elevates Saudi Arabia from a reactive regional actor to a central pillar in the Middle East order. 

That new Saudi positioning was captured succinctly by Dr. Hesham Alghannam, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and director general of the Security Research Center, National Security and Counterterrorism Department at Naif Arab University for Security Sciences. 

“The scene in Washington today cannot be understood as scattered deals about weapons or civilian nuclear cooperation. What is happening is a serious attempt to reshape the balance of power in the Middle East,” he told The Media Line. He noted that Saudi Arabia stands at the center of this balance and is a country that seeks real peace, lasting stability, and development that benefits everyone, not just itself. 

Alghannam said Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran each embody a different regional “model”, arguing that Riyadh is trying to shut down cycles of instability while its rivals rely on harder-edged approaches. “The Israeli model rests on permanent military superiority and a neighborhood kept fragile in the name of security,” he said, adding that Iran’s strategy hinges on militias that hollow out states and that any new security order will ultimately be judged on whether it backs the Saudi path or keeps the region hostage to crisis-driven alternatives. 

The headline of the visit was President Trump’s announcement that his administration would move forward with selling F-35 jets to Saudi Arabia—an unprecedented step that previous US administrations avoided over concerns about maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). 

For Alghannam, the jets are not just another platform in an already sizable Saudi arsenal; they change the geometry of deterrence. 

“These jets are not just new additions to a large fleet. They mark a shift in the layers of deterrence,” he said. He continued to note that the turbulence exposed during the twelve-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025 showed that whoever owns fifth-generation aircraft owns the ability to penetrate deep targets, disable defense networks, and strike strategic infrastructure with almost no warning. 

Alghannam warned that Iran’s expanding web of missiles, drones, and proxies from Yemen to Lebanon exposes a dangerous gap if Saudi Arabia lacks comparable capabilities, turning Riyadh into a weak link in the deterrence chain rather than a pillar of stability. “Saudi entry into the F-35 club means that any idea of striking oil facilities, cities, or critical infrastructure becomes a costly gamble,” he added. 

Cyril Widdershoven, senior fellow at Strategy International, a think tank in Cyprus, argues that the strategic calculus in Washington is shaped as much by the global contest with China as by the regional contest with Iran. 

He said the prospective F-35 sale fits the Trump administration’s deal-making style, casting it less as a straightforward security upgrade and more as a way to pull Riyadh deeper into Washington’s orbit and away from Beijing. “The strategic considerations behind it are maybe not even fully security-defense related, but mainly to counter the ‘perceived’ growing influence of China inside the Kingdom,” he told The Media Line. By tying Saudi Arabia to strict US conditions on access to advanced technology and intellectual property, he argued, the deal would narrow Riyadh’s room to explore alternative defense partnerships with China or Russia, he said. 

The analyst described the nuclear track as another arena where Washington is trying to anchor Saudi Arabia firmly within its strategic camp and limit Beijing’s footprint. The nuclear deal, he said, has been discussed for years already. “Riyadh’s position is clear and known. It wants to be in the same league as Iran, UAE, and maybe even looking at Egypt,” he added. He suggested that opting for US civilian nuclear technology would come with conditions that restrict Chinese involvement, while also giving Washington leverage to draw Saudi investment into American projects—an arrangement he framed as part of a broader US effort to rebuild regional ties through one-on-one agreements rather than multilateral frameworks. 

At the same time, Widdershoven cautioned against assuming that new capabilities alone will transform the balance of power overnight. 

Looking beyond the hardware, he warned that new systems alone will not dictate the regional balance, pointing instead to the political character of governing systems as the real source of either stability or volatility. “[I] don’t feel that selling F-35s will change the constellation, or the power projections at all,” he said. He pointed to past examples of rapid proliferation—most notably Pakistan’s path to nuclear capability—and suggested that these precedents, combined with recent Saudi-Pakistani ties, show how easily advanced systems can shift hands regardless of formal sales or restrictions. 

He also argued that Washington and its partners ultimately prefer to keep regional powers aligned with them rather than risk pushing those states toward rival blocs. “From a Western or Israeli view, it is better to have parties inside of your influence sphere than to force them to go and look elsewhere,” he added. He noted that exporting high-end systems still preserves a Western advantage because downgraded variants are typically supplied to non-NATO buyers, and that real deterrence depends as much on US engagement, training standards, and sustained military presence as on the platforms themselves. 

Politically, the F-35 package presents a direct test of the concept of Israel’s QME. Alghannam argues that crossing this line cannot happen without substantial Saudi commitments. 

According to Alghannam, the deal also presents an unprecedented test of the concept of Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” which Washington has guaranteed since the 1990s. Crossing this line cannot happen without substantial Saudi commitments: 

Firstly, serious guarantees to prevent leakage of sensitive technology to China, with clear limits on partnerships in the defense and digital sectors. 

Secondly, acceptance of a high level of operational integration with the United States, which keeps Washington inside the circle of control, updates, and software management in ways that protect Pentagon sensitivities. 

Thirdly, a regional framework that ensures rising Saudi power does not threaten Israel but instead constrains Iran and its proxies from threatening both sides and the Gulf as a whole. 

“The message is simple: Israeli superiority cannot survive by leaving others exposed and defenseless,” he noted. 

Widdershoven expects Israel to oppose the deal loudly, even as it quietly looks for ways to benefit. In his view, in public and officially, Israel will vehemently oppose these deals, while setting up Washington-Saudi-Israel discussion behind the scenes, propelled by international pressure due to the situation in Gaza and possibly also Lebanon and Syria. 

He notes that the potential deals on the table are clear and that Israel must decide how to proceed. While QME is an issue, any deal, whether nuclear power or F-35 jets, will take time to implement and will likely not be fully functional before 2030. “The power is in the details,” Widdershoven said, referring to the possible F-35 jet specifications and systems. 

According to Widdershoven, Israel needs to carefully consider its position, playing hardball while targeting opening the door to an agreement with Riyadh. In the absence of a regime change, Iran needs to be isolated. “The snake was hit, but the head stayed on,” he said. 

Justin Alexander, director at Khalij Economics and a Gulf Cooperation Council analyst, noted that two structural barriers have historically limited F-35 sales in the region. 

“Firstly, the longstanding doctrine of ensuring Israel has a ‘qualitative military edge’ projecting overwhelming power everywhere in the region, partly as a result of its F-35 fleet, including in the attack on Qatar in September,” he told The Media Line. 

“The second reason has been concerns about China accessing military secrets through espionage,” he said. He added that access to F-35s was supposed to have been a reward to the UAE for normalization with Israel, with the first Trump administration signing a $23 billion deal for 50 jets on its final day. Under the Biden administration, the deal was suspended indefinitely, apparently because of Chinese espionage concerns, including through the UAE’s use of Huawei’s 5G network, although reportedly there were also restrictions on usage intended to protect Israel that the UAE found excessive. 

He warned that the same dynamics could still derail the Saudi package. 

“We could see the same issues haunt a deal with Saudi Arabia, which could be signed but never be fulfilled, although the Trump administration still has over three years to advance it,” he said. 

At the same time, Alexander points out that advances in US technology could allow Washington to square the circle between arming Saudi Arabia and preserving Israel’s edge. 

“One reason the deal might go through is that the planned six-generation F-47 jet, due to go into operations within about five years, would significantly outclass the F-35 and so could be provided to Israel to ensure continued air superiority,” he noted. 

Civilian nuclear cooperation formed the second major pillar of the Trump–MBS discussions. Saudi Arabia is pushing for a domestic enrichment capability as part of its long-term energy and security strategy. 

For Alghannam, the nuclear track follows the same logic as the air power track: 

“Saudi Arabia is entering a phase that requires a new energy mix. A country of this scale and with such industrial and technological ambition cannot remain dependent on burning its own oil to generate electricity. Civilian nuclear energy, under strict safeguards, is a rational tool for diversification,” he said. 

Alghannam acknowledged that any Middle Eastern nuclear program will inevitably trigger suspicion about potential military uses, but argued that Riyadh is deliberately choosing a different path built on transparency, cooperation with Washington, and tight international oversight of enrichment. “It will not operate in the shadows as Tehran did, nor as an unspoken reality like the Israeli case,” he concluded. 

“It is in the Kingdom’s interest to close the door to a regional nuclear race. Such a race would drain resources, damage investor confidence, and undermine the economic transformation project at its core,” he added. 

Widdershoven also saw limited proliferation risk if the US remains engaged. 

In his view, Saudi nuclear ambitions are manageable so long as Washington stays directly involved and imposes strict safeguards. “Real nuclear proliferation issues are minimal, as all is already in place,” he said. He argued that firm US conditions, combined with Israeli concerns, would prevent a regional race and that full American and International Atomic Energy Agency oversight is essential, warning that if Washington hesitates, Riyadh could simply turn to Moscow or Beijing, with implications that would undermine Western and Israeli interests. 

Talk of an “arms race” after the Israel–Iran war has become a common shorthand. But Alexander is not convinced that is the right frame. 

Alexander said the popular “arms race” narrative overstates the level of danger, portraying much of the high-end procurement as status-driven rather than a prelude to war. “I’m not convinced there is really an adversarial arms race going on,” he said, pointing to a weakened Iran, a relatively calmer security environment for Gulf states, and the expectation that a sustained Gaza ceasefire would further reduce threats from actors such as the Houthis and make another Israeli strike on the Gulf unlikely. 

He also noted that Saudi defense spending has not been exploding in the way an arms race narrative would suggest. 

“Saudi military spending has actually been falling in recent years, down 7% in 2024 and 2% in the first nine months of 2025,” he said. 

Yet Alghannam stressed that recent increases are part of a targeted effort to build a multilayered shield after years of under-investment in certain domains and commented that talk of an “arms race” after the Israel–Iran war is misleading if viewed from the wrong angle. 

Alghannam agreed that Gulf defense budgets have risen sharply but pushed back against the idea that this signals a rush toward all-out conflict, saying the money is being used to plug vulnerabilities that built up over years of neglect. “It is an effort to close the gap between a growing threat that spreads through the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iraqi and Syrian militias, and a defense reality that has suffered years of delayed modernization,” he noted. 

According to Alghannam, Saudi Arabia is moving to build a multilayered deterrence shield: fifth-generation offensive airpower, advanced missile defenses, a cyber backbone that protects energy and infrastructure, and links that tie all of this to Gulf and regional networks. 

“The goal is not to provoke Iran into a nuclear confrontation. It is to send a precise message that using proxies against major Arab states will become far more expensive than any political or media gain,” he said. 

Within this emerging architecture, the question of normalization with Israel hangs over every negotiation. 

“For Saudi Arabia, normalization is not a prize handed to Israel in exchange for a weapons deal or a defense treaty, and not a marketing cover for a ‘new Middle East’ while Gaza and the West Bank remain under political and security rubble,” he said. 

“From a Saudi perspective, genuine normalization must rest on three pillars: a clear path to a viable Palestinian state, security arrangements that safeguard Israel without destroying its environment, and a reconstruction strategy in Gaza and the West Bank that ties funding to functioning state institutions rather than fragmented authorities,” he explained. 

With these pillars in place, Alghannam believes that normalization is possible in theory and even serves everyone’s interests. Yet he mentions that, in his view, it is not possible with an Israeli government whose doctrine is built on deepening occupation and dismantling the idea of a Palestinian state. 

“Without a real political price paid in favor of the Palestinians, any normalization deal will remain fragile and surrounded by popular landmines across the Arab and Muslim worlds,” he said. 

Alexander agreed that Riyadh’s red line has remained consistent. 

“Saudi Arabia has been very clear for years that it will not normalize until Israel makes serious moves towards ending the occupation, and there is currently no hint that this is a remote possibility under the current government,” he said. 

Beyond the details of aircraft variants, enrichment levels, and safeguards, Alghannam framed the Trump–MBS summit as a test of what kind of regional order Washington wants to back. 

“American arms sales serve a dual purpose. They strengthen the ability of the central Arab state, Saudi Arabia, to protect itself and its neighborhood, which reduces the pressure on Washington to intervene directly in every crisis,” he said. 

He continued to note that they also place a practical limit on the long-standing Israeli monopoly on a certain level of deterrence, in exchange for a clear Saudi commitment to act within a framework of regional stability rather than adventurist blocs. 

“American weapons in this case are not gifts,” he said. 

Alghannam also warned that timing and implementation will be crucial. 

He warned that the fate of any deal will hinge less on lofty communiqués and more on how it is anchored inside US institutions and managed over time, cautioning that partisan swings in Washington, great-power rivalry with China, and unrealistic demands on Riyadh could all strain the relationship. “The third risk is signing large commitments without clear implementation mechanisms, which would damage the trust between Riyadh and Washington,” he noted. 

Ultimately, Alghannam distilled the choice facing Washington into a stark binary. 

Alghannam said Washington is effectively choosing between two competing visions for the region, one built on perpetual dominance and instability and another on shared stability with Saudi Arabia as a central anchor state. “The real decision is this: Which model for the Middle East deserves support?” he asked, adding that Riyadh has already chosen its course and that the next move belongs to the United States. 

As President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed concluded their summit, the agreements now set in motion—F-35 transfers, nuclear cooperation, and the contours of a future normalization framework within the Abraham Accords—mark the beginning of a long, uncertain test: whether Washington and Riyadh can build a regional order based on stability rather than perpetual crisis, or whether this moment will become another unrealized promise in a region shaped as much by mistrust as ambition. 

Either way, the Middle East has entered a new chapter—one that places Saudi Arabia firmly at its center.